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What	the	2015	Greek	debt	negotiations	tell	us	about
Germany’s	negotiating	stance	on	Brexit
If	the	UK	wants	to	secure	favourable	terms	during	the	Brexit	negotiations,	it	will	be	crucial	to	win	the
support	of	Germany.	But	what	are	the	key	German	priorities	as	the	talks	move	on	to	the	second	phase?
Luuk	Molthof	writes	that	the	2015	Greek	debt	negotiations	offer	some	insights	into	the	German
approach,	and	that	the	UK	is	likely	to	be	disappointed	if	it	believes	Germany	will	put	economic	interests
above	its	political	support	for	European	integration.
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A	sigh	of	relief	was	heard	on	both	sides	of	the	channel	when	Jean-Claude	Juncker	announced	on	8	December	that
‘sufficient	progress’	had	been	made	in	the	first	round	of	Brexit	talks,	opening	the	way	for	the	second,	and	much	more
important,	phase	of	the	negotiations.	Some	commentators	saw	the	breakthrough	as	a	sign	that	the	British
government	had	finally	acknowledged	its	place	as	the	junior	partner.	Indeed,	to	be	able	to	move	on	to	the	trade	talks,
Theresa	May	had	given	in	to	most	of	the	EU’s	demands.
Yet	the	British	government	still	seems	fully	confident	that	it	will	be	able	to	negotiate	a	bespoke	trade	deal	for	itself.	At
the	heart	of	this	optimism	is	the	assumption	that	some	EU	countries,	such	as	Germany,	the	Netherlands,	and
Belgium,	have	a	significant	interest	in	good	trading	relations	with	the	UK	and	won’t	want	to	harm	themselves
economically	merely	to	‘punish’	Britain	for	leaving	the	EU.	The	British	government	seems	to	be	particularly	counting
on	Germany,	the	EU’s	central	power,	whose	export	sector	is	seen	as	being	much	too	dependent	on	the	British
economy	for	it	to	allow	Britain	to	walk	away	without	a	deal.
However,	many	German	politics	experts	have	warned	the	British	government	not	to	keep	its	hopes	up.	According	to
Charles	Grant,	“Germany’s	top	priority	is	to	ensure	that	Brexit	does	not	weaken	the	EU,	and	that	means	the	UK	must
not	be	allowed	any	kind	of	special	arrangements	that	could	undermine	the	European	institutions”.	In	a	similar	vein,
Sophia	Besch	and	Christian	Odendahl	point	out	that	“politically,	nothing	is	more	important	to	Germany	than	the
stability	and	integrity	of	the	EU”.
To	understand	why	the	British	government	would	do	well	to	heed	these	warnings,	it	is	useful	to	be	reminded	of
Germany’s	role	in	the	2015	Greek	bailout	negotiations.	The	case	is	illustrative	for	two	reasons.	First,	Germany’s
decision	back	then	to	agree	to	a	third	bailout	package	for	Greece,	despite	the	apparent	failings	of	the	first	two
packages,	is	indicative	of	Berlin’s	willingness	to	prioritise	political	over	economic	ends.	Second,	Germany’s	refusal	to
soften	Greece’s	bailout	conditions,	even	after	repeated	attempts	by	the	Greek	government	to	put	pressure	on	Berlin,
suggests	that	Germany	is	not	one	to	soften	its	position	at	the	behest	of	a	junior	negotiating	partner.
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Berlin’s	willingness	to	prioritise	political	over	economic	ends
What	the	British	government	tends	to	forget	is	that	for	Germany,	the	EU	is	first	and	foremost	a	political	project.	In	its
efforts	to	further	and	safeguard	European	integration,	Germany	has	often	prioritised	political	over	economic	interests.
So	too	in	the	summer	of	2015,	when	Germany,	alongside	the	other	eurozone	countries,	agreed	to	extend	a	third
bailout	package	to	Greece.	To	be	sure,	over	the	course	of	the	Greek	debt	negotiations,	Germany	never	lost	sight	of
its	economic	interests,	refusing	to	grant	Greece	its	much	wanted	Schuldenschnitt	and	remaining	firm	in	its	insistence
on	a	strict	reform	programme.	However,	it	always	kept	a	larger	perspective	in	mind.
Greece	had	received	two	bailout	packages	before,	the	first	in	2010	and	the	second	in	2012.	An	important	motivation
for	both	bailouts	was	the	concern	over	a	potential	domino	effect	in	the	case	of	a	Greek	default	and/or	exit	from	the
eurozone.	Another	–	at	least	in	2010	–	was	the	exposure	of	German	and	French	banks	to	Greek	debt.	In	bailing	out
Greece,	then,	Germany	and	the	other	eurozone	countries	acted	perfectly	in	line	with	their	own	economic	interests.
The	situation	in	2015,	however,	was	markedly	different.	Not	only	had	the	chances	of	a	domino	effect	been
significantly	reduced,	Europe’s	banks	had	written	off	most	of	their	Greek	debt.	The	economic	argument	for	bailing	out
Greece	yet	another	time	was	therefore	not	particularly	strong,	especially	since	Greece	was	increasingly	seen	as	a
Fass	ohne	Boden,	or	a	bottomless	pit.	The	reason	why	Germany	ultimately	agreed	to	another	bailout	was	because	a
Greek	exit	from	the	eurozone	would	undermine	the	euro’s	credibility	as	an	instrument	of	political	integration.	Most
significantly,	a	Grexit	would	mean	that	European	integration	would	no	longer	be	an	irreversible	and	linear	process	–
note	that	this	was	before	the	Brexit	referendum.	Speaking	to	the	Bundestag	on	19	March	2015,	Merkel	stated:
I	have	repeatedly	said:	If	the	euro	fails,	Europe	fails.	Some	found	and	still	find	this	too	dramatic.	But	I
remain	insistent;	for	the	euro	is	much	more	than	just	a	currency.	It	is,	next	to	the	institutions	that	we	have
established,	the	strongest	expression	of	our	willingness	to	really	unite	the	populations	of	Europe	in
prosperity	and	peace.
Economically,	it	may	well	have	made	better	sense	to	let	Greece	go.	Yet	in	order	to	protect	the	euro’s	role	as	a
political	instrument,	Germany	was	willing	to	bear	the	economic	costs.	Similarly,	Germany	is	likely	to	be	willing	to	bear
the	economic	costs	of	a	no	deal	Brexit	should	that	be	necessary	to	protect	the	integrity	of	the	internal	market.
Germany	is	not	one	to	soften	its	position	at	the	behest	of	a	junior	negotiating	partner
Just	like	the	British	government	is	currently	expecting	the	German	government	to	eventually	soften	its	position	and
give	in	to	certain	demands,	so	too	did	the	Greek	government	expect	the	German	government	to	eventually	soften	its
austerity	demands	and	perhaps	even	write	off	some	debt.	Greece	found	out	the	hard	way,	however,	that	Germany	is
not	one	to	soften	up	when	negotiating	with	a	junior	partner.	Over	the	course	of	the	2015	debt	negotiations,	the	Greek
government	made	continued	attempts	to	put	pressure	on	Germany	to	adjust	its	position,	using	delaying	tactics,
insisting	Germany	still	owed	Greece	compensation	for	WWII,	and	even	calling	a	domestic	referendum	on	the	bailout
conditions.	All	these	attempts	proved	futile	and	in	fact	only	strengthened	Germany’s	resilience.
Only	after	Germany’s	finance	minister,	Wolfgang	Schäuble,	started	talking	about	the	option	of	a	temporary	‘timeout’
from	the	eurozone,	did	it	dawn	on	the	Greek	government	that	it	had	vastly	overestimated	its	negotiating	position.	In
the	end,	the	Greek	government	inevitably	caved,	accepting	all	of	the	conditions	that	had	been	so	resoundingly
rejected	by	the	Greek	population	in	the	bailout	referendum.	The	drawing	out	of	the	negotiations	had	been	a	costly
affair	for	all	involved,	but	primarily	for	Greece.	The	British	government	faces	a	similar	suboptimal	outcome	should	it
fail	to	come	to	the	realisation	soon	that	it	is	indeed	the	junior	negotiating	partner,	that	time	is	really	not	on	its	side,
and	that	empty	threats	to	walk	away	from	the	negotiations	without	a	deal	aren’t	likely	to	change	anyone’s	mind,	least
of	all	Germany’s.
The	fact	that	Germany	is	likely	to	prioritise	its	political	interests	over	its	economic	interests	in	the	Brexit	negotiations,
and	is	unlikely	to	give	in	to	the	demands	of	a	junior	negotiating	partner,	is	not	to	say	that	Germany	does	not	seek	a
good	trading	relationship	with	Britain.	It	is	merely	to	say	that	it	won’t	agree	to	a	type	of	deal	that	undermines	the	EU
institutions	simply	because	it	doesn’t	want	to	see	a	drop	in	Mercedes’	sales.	Indeed,	even	the	German	industry	itself
has	let	it	be	known	that	the	integrity	of	the	internal	market	should	not	be	sacrificed	for	access	to	the	UK	market.	The
British	government	would	do	well	to	keep	this	in	mind	and	prepare	a	realistic	vision	for	its	post-Brexit	relationship	with
the	EU,	instead	of	waiting	for	the	Germans	to	lend	them	a	helping	hand.
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Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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